Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: lack of cumulative scientific growth and experimental-theoretical overgeneralization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological practitioners have been left to use intervention techniques that are not the (...) most effective or efficient. In order to improve upon this situation, unification is needed between radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology, among other disciplines. However, the issue of the reinforcer is only one of many areas where such unification should be pursued and attained. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

We argue that ecologists have conceived of the community concept in at least three ways, and that ecologists have used “community,” as indicated by ecological terminology, in two main ways. The typological conception emphasizes phenomenological descriptions of co-occurring species, the functional conception emphasizes mathematical relationships among co-occurring species, and the statistical conception emphasizes the frequency of species’ co-occurrence. The type usage emphasizes idealized “types,” and the group usage emphasizes quantitative boundaries and/or mathematically precise interactions. We further argue that all of (...) these senses of “community” are problematic. Ecologists seem unable to say precisely what a community is, in part because of the difficulty of measuring community properties, determining the temporal and spatial scale for various communities, and evaluating the different meanings attributed to community terms. We suggest that although and appear to be difficulties that are heuristically useful for future ecological theorizing, does not. (shrink)

How do you tell what’s right from what’s wrong? Can you always? What’s the difference between deduction, induction, and abduction? What are the best techniques for making an argument logically sound? In this fascinating little book, the smallest on its subject ever produced, philosopher Earl Fontainelle explores the ancient art of discursive Logic and demonstrates some of the techniques that have long been used to triumph over the debates and deceptions that assail us every day. Filled with helpful examples (...) of good and bad reasoning, Logic is an invaluable introduction to a defining human characteristic. (shrink)

Growing literature has linked attention bias variability to the experience and treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder. Unlike assessments of attention bias in only one direction, A...

Philosophers, policymakers, and scientists have long asserted that ecological science – and especially notions of homeostasis, balance, or stability – help to determine environmental values and to supply imperatives for environmental ethics and policy. We argue that this assertion is questionable. There are no well developed general ecological theories having predictive power, and fundamental ecological concepts, such as 'community' and 'stability', are used in inconsistent and ambiguous ways. As a consequence, the contribution of ecology to environmental ethics and values lies (...) more in the realm of natural history and case studies than in the realm of general theory. Moreover, although general ecological theory is unable to contribute to environmental values in the way many philosophers and policymakers have hoped, environmental values can and do contribute to ecological hypotheses and methods. Using examples related to preservation versus development, hunting versus animal rights, and controversies over pest control, we show that, because ecology is conceptually and theoretically underdetermined, environmental values often influence the practice of ecological science. (shrink)

Between 1998 and 2006, a new style of television news consumption was born: “news grazing.” With remote control devices in hand, “grazers” flip through TV news channels in order to find interesting news stories. Approximately three‐fifths of the public graze, and this group tends to be younger than non‐grazers. Grazers are less likely than the rest of the public to follow “hard” news about politics and economics, and, not surprisingly, they are even less knowledgeable about public affairs than most people (...) are. (shrink)

Although a number of articles have addressed ethical perceptions and behaviors, few studies have examined ethics across cultures. This research focuses on measuring the job satisfaction, customer orientation, ethics, and ethical training of automotive salespersons in the U.S. and Taiwan. The relationships of these variables to salesperson performance were also investigated. Ethics training was found to be negatively related to perceived levels of ethicalness and performance. High performance U.S. salespeople reported high ethical behavior, while the opposite was true in Taiwan. (...) Customer orientation in both countries was influenced by ethics training. Managers should evaluate current ethics training programs to insure correct ethical behavior is taught and rewarded. (shrink)

This is an introduction to metaphysics for students and non-philosophers. (Philosophers: it's supposed to be the kind of book you can give to your friends and family, when they ask what you do for a living.) Contents: personal identity, fatalism, time, God, why not nothing?, free will, constitution, universals, necessity and possibility, what is metaphysics? (There is a second edition, which adds chapters on meta-metaphysics and the metaphysics of ethics.).

Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.

Yoder rearranges the theological landscape -- North American Mennonite experience -- Amsterdam 1952 -- American church and society in the postwar era -- Mennonite mentors at Goshen College -- European experience and the debate about war -- A European assignment -- Relating to European Mennonite churches -- Confronting the moral question of war -- The world council of churches debate -- Doctoral studies with Barth and Cullman -- The theology of Karl Barth -- Oscar Cullmann and biblical studies -- Other (...) European conversations -- Disseration on the Swiss anabaptists -- Historical anabaptist research -- The core of anabaptist beliefs -- Constructing an anabaptist theology -- Understanding the "politics of Jesus " -- Characterizing theologies -- Yoder's theological language -- Yoder's constructive theology -- A lived praxis -- The "politics of Jesus " as social practice -- The challenge of just peacebuilding -- Basic principles of the "politics of Jesus ' -- A conversation with Catholic peace traditions -- Just peacebuilding collaboration -- The social praxis of the Christian community -- A religious peacebuilding program. (shrink)

This book argues that Wittgenstein's religious thought is misunderstood by its critics, and that their misunderstandings are a result of being oblivious of ...

Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...) the criterion, helps to disentangle epistemic and ethical evaluations, and illuminates the relationship between epistemic evaluations of beliefs and the evaluation of the methods used to form beliefs. These issues are all addressed in the essays presented here. External world skepticism poses the classic problem for an epistemological theory. The final essay in this volume argues that evidentialism is uniquely well qualified to make sense of skepticism and to respond to its challenge. Evidentialism is a version of epistemic internalism. Recent epistemology has included many attacks on internalism and has seen the development of numerous externalist theories. The essays included here respond to those attacks and raise objections to externalist theories, especially the principal rival, reliabilism. Internalism generally has been criticized for having unacceptable deontological implications, for failing to connect epistemic justification to truth, and for failing to provide an adequate account of what makes basic beliefs justified. Each of these charges is answered in these essays. The collection includes two previously unpublished essays and new afterwords to five of the reprinted essays; it will be the definitive resource on evidentialism for all epistemologists. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The common claim that American foreign policy is “imperial” is contradicted by the fact that the actual, definable historical empires have characteristically exercised formal, as well as decisive, control over their peripheral dependencies—properties that the keenest analysts do not ascribe to the geopolitical system that has been constructed by the United States. Why, then, the ascription of “empire” to the United States? One reason is to condemn American foreign policy by linking it to the unjust, destructive, and self‐destructive tendencies (...) that are held to be inherent in a nation’s quest for, and maintenance of, “empire.” The variant of this anti‐imperial thesis that has been the special province of certain conservatives and libertarians appropriates the “empire” thesis to invent non‐security motives for American foreign policies, and correspondingly to denigrate security threats to the United States. Yet—ironically—as with the more characteristic left‐wing anti‐imperialism, the conservative‐libertarian version exemplifies a cultural dimension of the strategic situation of the United States: Far from being an “empire,” or even an accomplished hegemon, America is better described (metaphorically) as the object of a multi‐pronged “siege.”. (shrink)

Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...) criterion, helps to disentangle epistemic and ethical evaluations, and illuminates the relationship between epistemic evaluations of beliefs and the evaluation of the methods used to form beliefs. These issues are all addressed in the essays presented here. External world skepticism poses the classic problem for an epistemological theory. The final essay in this volume argues that evidentialism is uniquely well qualified to make sense of skepticism and to respond to its challenge.Evidentialism is a version of epistemic internalism. Recent epistemology has included many attacks on internalism and has seen the development of numerous externalist theories. The essays included here respond to those attacks and raise objections to externalist theories, especially the principal rival, reliabilism. Internalism generally has been criticized for having unacceptable deontological implications, for failing to connect epistemic justification to truth, and for failing to provide an adequate account of what makes basic beliefs justified. Each of these charges is answered in these essays. The collection includes two previously unpublished essays and new afterwords to five of the reprinted essays; it will be the definitive resource on evidentialism for all epistemologists. (shrink)

A state's foreign policy is constrained by parameters that inhere in the structure of the international system and in the nation's own political‐constitutional, social, and economic systems. The latter, domestic parameters, include “public opinion.” Because the public is largely ignorant of foreign affairs, policy‐making elites have wide scope for acting more rationally than would otherwise be possible, although public opinion operates on the second‐order effects of foreign policy (e.g., taxes, casualties)—inviting mismatches of objectives and means. The prevalent nonrational theories of (...) foreign‐policy derivation are themselves largely ignorant of the dominantly rational processes of the state, particularly in its foreign and military functions. (shrink)

Advertisers often use computers to create fantastic images. Generally, these are perfectly harmless images that are used for comic or dramatic effect. Sometimes, however, they are problematic human images that I call computer-generated images of perfection. Advertisers create these images by using computer technology to remove unwanted traits from models or to generate entire human bodies. They are images that portray ideal human beauty, bodies, or looks. In this paper, I argue that the use of such images is unethical. I (...) begin by explaining the common objections against advertising and by demonstrating how critics might argue that those objections apply to computer-generated images of perfection. Along the way, I demonstrate an ethically significant difference between computer-generated images of perfection and the images in ordinary ads. I argue that although critics might use this fact to apply the common objections to the use of computer-generated images of perfection, the objections fail. Finally, I argue that despite surviving the common objections, the use of computer-generated images of perfection is subject to an ethical objection that is based on aesthetic considerations. Advertisers are ethically obligated to avoid certain aesthetic results that are produced by computer-generated images of perfection. (shrink)

Howard Thurman (1899?1981) touched the lives of many leaders in and beyond the US civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Thurman earned his degree in politics/economics at Morehouse College and in theology at Rochester Theological Seminary. He served as dean of the chapel at Boston University from 1953 to 1965. At once mystic, pacifist and integrationist, his thought was vitally impacted by experience of oppression in America?s Deep South. Thurman was an isolated child in an aggrieved community, forced (...) back upon a deep inner spirituality to cope with material deprivation and indifference. He explored the importance of ?sites of memory? as a means of recovering emotion, not least grief. For Thurman, the individual is the point of departure, but is only fully constituted in ?the crucible of relationship?; the purpose of knowledge is action; and the object of action is to secure loving relationships. (shrink)

Pepper’s concept of a root metaphor possesses profound implications for any theory that attempts to explain language, especially those theories that try to construct explanatory accounts of ambiguity and metaphor. Any explanatory theory of metaphor must as a theory necessarily be metaphorical in the sense of presupposing a root metaphor. But this discovery does not mean that all language is metaphorical; there can be literal language even though metalinguistic accounts of language including metaphor must be founded upon root metaphors.

This article advances towards the reconceptualization of financial innovation. It examines the calamitous role of financial innovation in the global financial crisis, developing a non-rational theorization of finance within the social economy that factors in the role of affect. Outlining the foundations for such an approach, the analysis draws on Thorstein Veblen and Georges Bataille, whose work encompasses psycho-social conceptions of political-economic agency. From the more anthropological lens of Veblen and Bataille's theorizations, it is possible to move beyond instrumentalist accounts (...) of financial innovation premised on pecuniary expedients and aspirations of market completion. As we argue, in a broader affective economy, contemporary financial innovation serves invidious ends, providing a means of attaining social distinction, constituting a medium for violent expenditure and bestowing access to sovereign expression on its purveyors. Highlighting the non-rational dimension of financial markets prompts a reconsideration of the nature of crisis and the means of its redress. (shrink)

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral (...) theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore. (shrink)

In this book, Earl Mac Cormac presents an original and unified cognitive theory of metaphor using philosophical arguments which draw upon evidence from psychological experiments and theories. He notes that implications of this theory for meaning and truth with specific attention to metaphor as a speech act, the iconic meaning of metaphor, and the development of a four-valued system of truth. Numerous examples of metaphor from poetry and science are presented and analyzed to support Mac Cormac's theory. A Cognitive (...) Theory of Metaphortakes up three levels of explanation—metaphor as expressed in surface language, the semantics of metaphor, and metaphor as a cogitive process—and unifies these by interpreting metaphor as an evolutionary knowledge process in which metaphors mediate between minds and culture. Mac Cormac considers, and rejects, the radical theory that all use of language is metaphorical; however, this argument also recognizes that the theoryof metaphor may itself be metaphorical. The book first considers the computational metaphor often adopted by cognitive psychology as an example of metaphor requiring analysis. In contrast to three well-known philosophical theories of metaphor—the tension theory, the controversion theory, and the grammatical deviance theory—it develops a semantical anomaly theory of metaphor based on a quasi-mathematical hierarchy of words. In developing the theory, Mac Cormac makes much-needed connections between theories of metaphor and more orthodox analytic philosophy of meaning, including discussions of speech acts and the logic of fuzzy sets. This semantical theory of explanation is then shown to be compatible with contemporary psychological theories of memory. (shrink)

Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those (...) recent defenses. First, my defense accounts for the wide range of circumstances in which we experience Schadenfreude. Those circumstances often involve feelings and judgments that are less noble and admirable than judgments regarding just deserts. Second, it accounts for the sheepish or apologetic feelings that commonly accompany Schadenfreude. The two recent defenses can account for those feelings only by holding that they are mistaken or misguided. In opposition to those who view Schadenfreude as a moral failing, I argue that it is morally permissible unless it is part of a causal chain that produces an immoral act. The moral permissibility of the emotion is necessary in order for individuals to have the emotional freedom that, in turn, is necessary for their well-being. Schadenfreude’s moral status is similar to a sexual fetish’s. Like a fetish, experiencing Schadenfreude is not immoral in itself, but sharing and discussing it with others is immoral in many contexts. (shrink)

In business ethics literature, debate over a special ethics generally has framed examination of the rules governing business. By constructing a dilemma faced by proponents of a special ethics, I argue that this framing is misguided. Proponents must adopt either an insular or a derivative conception. The former, the view that business is insulated from moral rules, is problematic because arguments used to support it force proponents to accept the idea that each aspect of life is insulated from moral rules. (...) This idea, however, renders philosophically insignificant the claim that business has a special ethics. Proponents no longer make a claim about business, but, rather, a relativistic claim about ethics in general. The derivative conception is the view that business is a set of circumstances that bear on the application of moral rules. This, however, is true of each aspect of life, and is simply an application of the principle 'ought implies can'. The result is that there is nothing special about this sense of a special ethics. Despite lacking specialness, however, the derivative conception provides proper framing for examination of the rules governing business. It subjects business to moral rules, but, also, accounts for the challenging circumstances businesspersons face. (shrink)

In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will (...) argue that the examples that Bishop presents pose no such problem for some theories. I will illustrate the exempt theories by describing how an evidentialist view can account for the justification in the examples without having any similar problem. It will be clear that other views about justification are likewise unaffected by anything like the generality problem. (shrink)

The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.